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STABILITY PACT 
REFORM: A LOOK AT 





 There is a French phrase “l’Esprit d’Escaliers” (literally “the spirit 
of the stairs”) that describes a sentiment that is sometimes felt when 
climbing stairs to bed having completed a hard day’s work. It 
conveys the feeling that the day’s work could and should have been 
done better.  
1. 
Introduction 
In March of this year, the European Council endorsed 
proposals from ECOFIN to reform the Stability and Growth Pact, 
ending a political debate that had surrounded the Pact arising from 
the suspension of the Excessive Deficit Procedure against France 
and Germany in November 2003. But although the political debate 
is over, an analysis of the decisions taken is warranted, particularly 
given the gravity of Europe’s fiscal situation.  
As we “ascend the stairs”, it is impossible not to feel that the 
Pact could have been reformed in a much better way; as shown in 
Table 1 below, the EU’s public finances continue to deteriorate. 
But it is never enough to criticise. If you complain about the 
dark, then at least light a candle. In this spirit, the paper outlines 
how a reform of the Pact could have been constructive, credible 
and consensual. Two issues have arisen since the Pact’s creation in 
1996 which together provide a credible reason for reform, i.e. one 
not open to the charge that the Pact was reformed by politicians for 
political reasons (a charge that haunts the present reform). 
First, EU enlargement has made Europe a more fiscally 
heterogeneous place. Compared to other member states, new 
member states have higher fiscal deficit ratios, but also lower 
government debt ratios and stronger trend growth and thus a higher 
 
1This paper is an updated version of the paper “Reforming the Pact Without 
Frightening the Horses” delivered at the annual Dublin Economics Workshop in 
Kenmare, October 2004. The central feature of it derives from research by the 
Author and by Christophe Kamps as part of the Advanced Studies Programme at 
the Institute of World Economics in Kiel.  
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capacity to absorb those higher deficits. Those higher deficits are 
broadly proportionate to higher levels of capital expenditure, 
compared to other member states. As developing counties with 
higher marginal productivity of capital, this is a new fact that should 
have prompted reform of the Pact regardless of the events of 
November 2003. Second, the attention on the fiscal challenge of 
ageing in Europe has intensified and strengthened the case for 
shifting the emphasis of the Pact towards fiscal sustainability. 
This paper aims to show how a clear, credible and consistent 
reform of the Pact could have arisen from these two considerations. 
It also identifies improvements that needed to be made in the Pact’s 
institutional design. Section 2 of the paper outlines the key features 
of the Pact that are relevant to its possible reform. Section 3 gives 
an account of the crisis in the Pact in November 2003, the build up 
to it and the various proposals to reform that preceded this crisis. 
Section 4 contains the central feature of the paper. It sketches the 
rationale and outline of an “ideal” reform of the Pact, a reform that 
could have dealt with the aforementioned issues by relaxing its 
provisions in relation to medium-term fiscal balances, toughened its 
provisions in relation to long-term debt and improved some key 
features of implementation. Section 5 concludes. 
 
  Three dimensions of the Pact are to be considered in the context 
of reform. The first is its substantive purpose; i.e. the fiscal rules it 
stipulates. The second is institutional design; i.e. the mechanisms by 




of the Stability 
and Growth 
Pact The substantive rules of the Pact are as follows: 
1. Member States must avoid incurring a General 
Government Deficit in excess of 3.0 per cent of GDP 
unless this results from either an “unusual event outside the 
control of the Member State concerned” or from a “severe 
economic downturn”. The first caveat is not defined in the 
Pact while the second is defined as an annual fall in real 
GDP of at least 2 percentage points.2 
2.  Member States must maintain budget balances that when 
adjusted for the effects of the economic cycle are “Close to 
Balance or in Surplus” and should avoid fiscal policies 
which are pro-cyclical – aiming in other words for 
surpluses in good times and deficits safely within the 3.0 
per cent limit in bad times.3 
3. Member  States  must  maintain General Government Debt 
levels of below 60 per cent of GDP. However, this aspect 
 
2 If further supportive evidence is available, a 0.75 percentage point or greater 
decline in real GDP may also be regarded as a severe downturn. 
3 The “Close to Balance or in Surplus” criteria for fiscal balances in measured by 
the Commission with reference to a specified and agreed method for adjusting 
“headline” General Government Balances for the effects of the economic cycle. 
For a discussion on the methodology see Denis, McMorrow and Roeger (2002).  
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of the Pact was not implemented and the equivalent 
stipulation in the Treaty that countries permitted to join the 
Euro Area should have debt levels below this threshold did 
not prevent Belgium, Italy or Greece from successfully 
joining the euro with debt levels that were significantly 
higher. 
In terms of its institutional design, the Pact might be seen as 
having two arms, one preventative and one dissuasive. 
The first, preventative “arm” is constituted by Council 
regulation 1466/97. This stipulates that Member States will provide 
Stability Programmes once in EMU on an annual basis, that these 
will contain medium-term budgetary targets4 and that these 
programmes and their implementation will be regularly monitored 
by the Council and Commission. More importantly, any divergence 
from sound medium-term budgetary intentions contained in the 
programmes, or any failure to implement budgetary plans in an 
acceptable manner will be dealt with by an early warning system. 
The second, dissuasive arm deals with the situation where the 
preventative arm has failed. It is constituted by Council regulation 
1467/97 and is based on article 104 of the Treaty. This regulation 
defines the “Excessive Deficit Procedure” – a procedure which may 
lead to the imposition of sanctions.  
A key issue is that the discretion of imposing sanction rests 
ultimately with the Council. The German Finance Minister at the 
time of the Pact’s negotiation and conclusion, Theo Waigel, 
proposed the creation of an independent “Stability Council” to 
implement the Pact. The Commission raised the difficulty that such 
an approach would pose from the point of view of infringing the 
sovereignty of Member States. For this reason, the power of 
implementing the Pact was left in the hands of the Council. 
Finally, the statistical interpretation of the Pact deserves brief 
reference here before being dealt with in Section 4. Arguments have 
been made for a looser interpretation of the definition of the 
General Government Deficit. Giavazzi and Blanchard (2003) note 
that Article 104.3 of the Treaty would in theory permit an 
interpretation of the Pact to exclude net investment expenditures by 
reform of Council regulation 1467/97. This issue is relevant to 




Crisis in the Pact and Fiscal Deterioration  3. 
From Crisis to 
Reform 
In spite of wide-ranging academic debate surrounding these aspects 
of the Pact’s design, the political consensus behind it continued to 
be strong during the years immediately before and after the 
introduction of the euro.  
 
4These targets must be consistent with the “Close to Balance or in Surplus” criteria 
of the Pact.  
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The year 2003 began with some prospect of a positive reform 
process, as commissioned by the outgoing European Commission 
President, Romano Prodi, the “Sapir Report”5 made several 
recommendations for reforming the Pact. The year ended with the 
institutional credibility of the Pact seriously in question as France 
and Germany successfully lobbied a majority of the Council to 
suspend the Excessive Deficit Procedure against them.  
The table in Annex I shows how this transition occurred. The 
crisis in the Pact had its origins in the failure to give an early 
warning to Germany and Portugal in early 2002. In Portugal’s case 
the deficit warning turned out to be accurate and in November 
2002 the Council accepted a Commission recommendation to the 
effect that Portugal had an excessive deficit. 
However, following this implementation against Portugal (and a 
real commitment to severe fiscal correction by that country), France 
and Germany lobbied successfully in November 2003 to have the 
Pact’s Excessive Deficit Procedure suspended in relation to their 
budgetary positions. 
Since then and according to the Spring 2004 forecasts of the 
European Commission,6 six countries have breached the deficit in 
2004 and four are projected to do so in 2005, with Germany and 
Greece coming close to breach. Thus adherence to the Pact is 
clearly declining. 
Table 1: Actual and Cyclically Adjusted Balances 
  Actual Budgetary Balances 
Cyclically Adjusted Budgetary 
Balances 
  2002  2003  2004  2005  2002  2003  2004  2005 
Belgium  0.1  0.2  -0.5  -0.7  0.1  0.7  0.0  -0.5 
Germany  -3.5  -3.9  -3.6  -2.8  -3.5  -3.2  -2.9  -2.3 
Greece  -1.4  -3.2  -3.2  -2.8  -1.7  -3.6  -4.1  -3.8 
Spain  0.0  0.3  0.4  0.6  -0.2  0.4  0.6  0.7 
France  -3.2  -4.1  -3.7  -3.6  -3.8  -3.9  -3.4  -3.3 
Ireland  -0.2  0.2  -0.8  -1.0  -1.9  0.1  -0.3  -0.2 
Italy  -2.3  -2.8  -3.2  -4.0  -2.2  -1.9  -2.6  -3.6 
Luxembourg  2.7  -0.1  -2  -2.3  2.7  1.3  0.6  1.2 
Netherlands  -1.9  -3.2  -3.5  -3.3  -2.6  -2  -1.7  -1.3 
Austria  -0.2  -1.1  -1.1  -1.9  -0.3  -0.9  -0.9  -1.8 
Portugal  -2.7  -2.8  -3.4  -3.8  -2.7  -1.8  -2.1  -2.6 
Finland  4.3  2.3  2  2.1  3.7  2.3  2.1  2.2 
Source: 2004 Public Finance Report of the European Commission. 
  
 
5 After its main author, Professor Andre Sapir, the then adviser to Mr. Prodi. 
6 These were the latest forecasts available at the time of writing. Subsequent 
forecasts do not fundamentally differ for the purposes of this paper.  
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Commission Reform Proposals 
The “Sapir Report” published in 2003 argued that the “exceptional 
circumstances” defined in the Pact for exempting a Member State 
from sanctions in the case of a breach of the 3 per cent deficit limit 
be made more lenient. It also suggested that the GDP growth rate 
required for such an exemption be changed from a negative growth 
of 2.0 per cent7 to a rate of zero growth and that cyclically adjusted 
deficits of up to 1.5 per cent of GDP be permitted for counties 
with debt to GDP ratios that were below 40 per cent. The Sapir 
Report also called for greater macroeconomic co-ordination in 
Europe. It called for a greater contribution to be made to growth by 
fiscal policy. The first two proposals are revisited in the final section 
of this paper. 
In the summer of 2004 the Commission’s Public Finance 
Report proposed a further tentative outline of reform. It proposed 
to redefine the medium-term objectives of close to balance or in 
surplus to allow low debt countries more flexibility and to place 
more emphasis on debt and sustainability in the surveillance of 
budgetary positions and to initiate Excessive Deficit Procedures in 
case of inappropriate debt developments.  
It also sought to cater for protracted slowdowns by redefining 
“exceptional circumstances” more loosely and to allow for country 
specific elements in the enforcement of the correction of excessive 
deficits, including setting more flexible deadlines. On the 
institutional side it called for early warnings and recommendations 
to be used more actively.  
ECOFIN Proposals 
The ECOFIN proposals, endorsed by the European Council in 
March 2005, contain a reference to the need for economic and 
budgetary policies to “… set the right priority towards…the 
strengthening of private investment and consumption in phases of 
weak economic growth”. As well as improving the economic 
rationale of the Pact, these reforms also aim to improve national 
“ownership” of fiscal policy.  
Furthermore, in a watering down of the Excessive Deficit 
Procedure, its rationale is stated as being “assisting rather than 
punishing” member states and the incentives for Member States to 
adhere to the Pact are cited as “surveillance”, “peer pressure” and 
“peer support”. The reforms also reaffirm the power of the Council 
to reiterate sanctions – a key institutional weakness of the Pact. 
Some references are made to ensure more budgetary discipline 
in good times and on the other hand allow more leniency in times 
 
7 It should be noted at the outset that the operation of the stability and growth pact 
allows for a ’grey area’ for a GDP decline of between 0.75 and 2.0 per cent in 
which consideration can be given to defining economic circumstances as 
sufficiently exceptional to permit an excessive deficit.  
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when economic growth is below trend. The need to give sufficient 
attention to debt and sustainability is also recognised.  
However, the proposals request that in future the Commission 
is requested to include in its reports to the Council a variety of 
factors in assessing the budgetary situation of a Member State, 
including whether the deficit exceeds the level of investment 
expenditure and the existence of “other relevant factors” that might 
pertain to the budgetary balance. Also noteworthy are the 
extensions of the deadlines stipulated for the operation of the 
Excessive Deficit Procedures (by a total of six months) as well as 
for the implementation of fiscal correction in case of breach (by 
one year).  
What is clear is that the evolution of reform proposals from 
those advanced by the Sapir Report to those endorsed by the 
Council in Spring 2005 has followed a trend of declining connection 
to fundamental economic rationale and increasing inclusion of 
exceptional provisions.  
But the need in relation to Pact reform was not only to improve 
its economic design, but more importantly to restore its credibility 
as a rule that would be respected and implemented. This required 
basing reforms on a strong, durable and thorough economic 
rationale. What might this rationale have looked like? 
 
 
Economic Rationale for Reform  4. 
EU 
Enlargement 
and Reform: A 
Look at What 
Might Have 
Been
The main economic rationale for reforming the Pact can be 
illustrated by pointing to some basic differences between the ten 
acceding countries (“AC10”) and other Member States (“EC15”) 
contained in Table 2 and Table 3. 
Table 2: Key Economic Indicators for EU15 and AC10 Countries in 
2002 
  GDP per Capita*  Real GDP growth 
EU15  100.0  1.1 
AC10  53.0  4.1 
Source: European Commission, Spring 2004 forecasts and Summer Public Finance Report. 
*Taking EU15 as = 100 in 2002. 
Table 3: Key Fiscal Indicators for EU15 and AC10 Countries 






EU15  -2.0  62.6  2.2 
AC10  -4.0  37.6  3.7 
Source:: European Commission, Spring 2004. 
 
Five clear differences emerge: 
1.  Average GDP per capita in the AC10 group is about half of 
what it is in EU15 group. 
2.  Average real GDP growth is considerably higher in the 
AC10 group, compared to the EU15 group. 
3.  The average deficit in the AC10 group is about twice that 
of the EU15 group.  
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4.  The average debt/GDP ratio in 2002 is over 60 per cent 
for the EU15 group but just under 40 per cent for the 
AC10 group. 
5.  The ratio of capital expenditure to GDP is 1.5 percentage 
points higher for the AC10 group compared to the EU15 
group and this differential is comparable with the 2 
percentage points differential in the relative sizes of deficits 
between the two groups. 
Classic growth theory suggests that countries with lower GDP 
per capita grow faster and have a higher marginal productivity of 
capital. Both circumstances – ceteris paribus – justify higher rates of 
capital investment. Higher growth rates also permit higher 
sustainable deficits as the impact on the Debt/GDP ratio is offset 
by higher GDP growth. 
By considering in turn two fundamental goals of the Pact – 
sustainability and stability – the implications of these facts for 
desirable reform become clearer: 
Sustainability and the Debt and Deficit Limits 
The Pact limits of 3 per cent and 60 per cent on the deficit and debt 
ratios, respectively, follow a basic mathematical logic. Assuming no 
monetary financing of debt, debt should be maintained at its 
existing level provided that the following condition holds: 
 
Budget deficit = Debt level x. Trend Nominal Growth Rate. 
 
Taking a debt level of 60 per cent of GDP as constituting long-
term sustainability, the budget deficit should be 60 per cent of the 
trend nominal growth rate in order to prevent the debt ratio from 
growing. The figure below shows debt evolution under the 
assumption of “just-in-line” with the Pact – namely assuming a 
deficit of 3 per cent per annum run every year – for two different 
scenarios. 
The first scenario is for a “traditional” EU member state, with 
nominal trend growth of 5 per cent.8 The second is for a new 
member state with trend growth of 7 per cent and a lower starting 
debt ratio. Assuming both maintain a deficit of 3 per cent 
indefinitely the traditional EU member state maintains a stable debt 
ratio while the new member state’s debt ratio declines secularly. 
This shows that the same fiscal rules have different implications for 
sustainability depending on trend growth and initial debt ratios. 
As the ultimate rationale of the Pact is to protect the stability of 
the Euro, it is important at this juncture to consider that financial 
markets are more concerned about the sustainability of a country’s 
debt situation than about any particular current deficit limit9. In an 
ECB paper, Afonso and Strauch (2004) examine the behaviour of 
interest rate swap spreads to major fiscal policy events during 2002 
 
 
9 Of course if the deficit is symptomatic of or symbolic of deeper debt problems 
the two may be regarded with concern by financial markets.  
  8 
and estimate a reaction function for these spreads. They find that 
capital markets reacted rather weakly to emerging news about the 
deficits of Euro Area countries.  


























































Debt/GDP 60%: Nominal Trend Growth 5% Debt/GDP 40%: Nominal Trend Growth 7%
Stability and the “Close to Balance or in Surplus” Rule 
Turning to stability, the Pact aims to stabilise fiscal outcomes by 
encouraging the maintenance of medium-term fiscal balances 
around which cyclical conditions should move short-term nominal 
fiscal balances within a corridor of plus or minus 3 per cent of 
GDP. 
The deficit should respond to the cycle according to the 
following simple relationship: 
dt = ds + β(ys-yt) 
The deficit in time t equals the structural deficit plus the 
budgetary elasticity times the output gap. 
The figure below shows a simple stylised process of fiscal 
breathing which illustrates how the Stability and Growth Pact is 
designed to function in an ideal state. The figure assumes that the 
economy operates according to the standard seven year “Burns 
Mitchell” cycle. 
Trend growth is assumed to be 3.0 per cent and the output gap 
is assumed to fluctuate between plus and minus 3 per cent. The 
actual real GDP growth rate therefore fluctuates between 6 and 0 
per cent.   
     9 
Assuming a medium-term structural balance of -0.5 per cent10 
and a budgetary elasticity of 0.5,11 the figure below shows how, in 
an idealised state of no discretionary intervention or non-cyclical 
macroeconomic or fiscal shocks, automatic stabilisers will ensure 
the smooth fluctuation of the budgetary balance between +1 and -2 
percentage points.  






























































Structural balance Actual growth
Output gap Budget balance
GDP decline of 2% taken as a "severe downturn"
 
Note that under these idealised assumptions the budgetary balance 
is -2 percentage points when the GDP growth rate is 0 per cent. In 
this scenario a breach of the 3 per cent deficit rule would be 
consistent with a GDP decline of 2 per cent. This breach would be 
exempted under the terms of the Pact on the grounds of qualifying 
as a “severe economic downturn”. 
 
10 According to the European Commission (2001a) a margin of 0.5 per cent of 
GDP below strict balance can be allowed for when assessing compliance with the 
“Close to Balance or in Surplus” criteria.  
11 An elasticity of the budget balance with respect to the output gap of 0.5 
percentage points is consistent with a wide range of evidence in relation to 
budgetary balances and output gaps in EU and OECD countries. See for example 
OECD (1997).  
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Now take a country with high trend growth, higher budgetary 
elasticities and a higher mean output gap. The figure below shows 
the evolution of the budgetary balance over the same seven year 
economic cycle, but for a stylised New Member State.  





































































Structural balance Budget balance
Actual growth Output gap
GDP decline of 2% taken as a "severe downturn"
 
The trend growth rate of real GDP is assumed to be 5 per cent, 
2 percentage points higher than for a more mature European 
economy. The budgetary elasticity is assumed to be 0.7 percentage 
points and the output gap is amplified by a factor of 1.5 to reflect a 
relative dependence on the world economy and foreign direct 
investment. 
The structural balance is assumed to be -0.5 percentage points 
as before and the economy of the idealised New Member State is 
assumed to be in step with the global economy in the same manner 
as assumed for the traditional case above (although the output gap 
is assumed to be slightly more volatile as mentioned above).  
By contrasting the developments in the two figures for year 
seven, the irony of the situation is clear. The idealized “New 
Member State” has a higher growth rate than the traditional EU 
Member State at the same position in the economic cycle. This is as 
a result of higher trend GDP growth.  
However, a higher budgetary elasticity and a slightly more 
volatile output gap means that this country could nonetheless 
breach the Pact, whereas a more mature economy would withstand  
     11 
 its higher trend growth rate the 
idea
shows that a tighter structural position – a 
surp
the worst point of the cycle with a deficit that was still safely 
removed from the 3 per cent limit. 
The further irony is that due to
lised New Member State breaches the deficit limit at a rate of 
real GDP growth of around +1 per cent, well above the limits 
specified in the Pact. 
The next figure 
lus of 0.5 per cent – would be required to avert a breach of the 
Pact. Even with this tighter position, the budget balance scrapes 
quite near the 3 per cent limit, allowing little margin for a sudden 
shock. 
Figure 4:   eration of the Stability and Growth Pact: The Case of a New  The Op




































































Structural balance Budget balance
Actual growth Output gap
GDP decline of 2% taken as a "severe downturn"
 
These figures illustrate an important anomaly in the Pact. A 
seve
 of this observation in relation to new member 
states is strengthened by considering the issue of their budgetary 
elasticities. 
re economic downturn is defined in terms of a rate of GDP 
growth. But the key anchor of the Pact is defined in terms of the 
output gap. This means that higher trend growth countries must 
suffer higher deterioration in terms of output gap before being able 
to avail of the -2 per cent “get-out” clause, compared to lower 
growth countries. 
The relevance 
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tage points. The same source suggests that the 
assu
s a legacy 
of d
As calculated by van den Noord (2000) the mean value of the 
output gap in the 15 countries of the pre-enlargement EU is around 
2.5 percen
mption of a budgetary elasticity of around 0.5 percentage points 
is also a reasonable one for the same group of countries. However, 
the elasticities are higher in Denmark, Sweden and Norway, 
countries that may join EMU in future. This would imply the need 
for more demanding medium-term budgetary restrictions. 
Elasticities for New Member States are unknown, they are 
possibly higher than other member states as in Scandinavian 
counties, given that the State remains relatively dominant a
ecades of communism. 
This would imply the need for more demanding medium-term 
balance criteria to avoid a breach of 3 per cent deficit limit. 
Institutional Rationale for Reform 
Two key institutional features need to be considered in the context 
of reform. 
Firstly, the Excessive Deficit Procedure was lengthy and 




complex and this problem is worsened by recent reforms (see 
below). Bee
danger that punishment of a breach of the Pact occurs so long 
after the incidence of fiscal deterioration, that offending 
government may have been replaced by the opposition. This lowers 
the incentive for governments to adhere to the Pact and raises the 
possibility that the government being punished was in opposition at 
the time of the offence, as was in fact that case when Portugal was 
disciplined in 2003: The second is the scope created for haggling, 
bargaining and watering down of the Pact’s provisions. 
The second issue is the discretion of the Council in applying the 
Pact. Inman (1996) examined the effectiveness of balance budget 
rules in the U.S. and found that amongst the crit
rmining their success was the question of whether they were 
enforced by an independent authority. De Haan (2004) sees the lack 
of political independence in the Pact’s implementation as its key 
institutional weakness. The potential for this weakness was spotted 
in 1995 by German Finance Minister Theo Waigel who proposed 
creating an independent “Stability Council” to monitor the Pact. 
The idea was objected to by the Commission. 
The Parameters of Reform 
The economic and institutional issues raised above are now 
projected onto four aspects of reform. 
1.  The definition of exceptional circumstances 
2. The  debt  threshold 
3.  The close to balance or in surplus provision 
4.  Sound institutional workings  
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Parameter 1: Redefining Exceptional Circumstances 
The original Pact permitted an exception from punishment for 
deficit breach in two ways. 
First, it defined an “… unusual events outside the control of 
the Member State concerned and which has a major impact on the 
financial position of a Member State”.  
Second it defined a “severe economic downturn”, constituting 
an annual fall of at least 2 percentage points of GDP. A fall of 
greater than 0.75 percentage points of GDP may also be considered 
as constituting a severe economic downturn. 
In Section 1 the need for simplicity and credibility in fiscal rules 
was observed. On this basis the provision for “unusual events 
outside the control” of the Member State should have been 
abolished or curtailed. In fact it has now been strengthened.  
Third and in the other direction, the criteria of requiring GDP 
to fall by 2 percentage points constituted a highly extreme definition 
of exceptional circumstances. Such declines are seen usually only in 
wartime. We might note also that Portugal and Germany would, 
under such a rule change, have been able to legitimately escape 
censure for breaching the 3 per cent deficit rule in 2002. France 
would still have been culpable, but would have been excused in 
2003. The excessive strictness of the Pact in relation to the 
definition of a severe economic downturn might therefore be seen 
to have been one of the causes of the Pact’s problems – the other 
being the role of the Council in implementing it. 
Parameter 2: Complementary Debt Thresholds 
Debt criteria have never been subject to the full operation of the 
Excessive Deficit Procedure. Yet concerns about population ageing 
mount and several member states have debt levels well in excess of 
the Pact’s threshold of 60 per cent of GDP. New member states, 
however, have significantly lower debt levels. 
By ignoring debt, the Excessive Deficit Procedure thus 
punishes the higher deficits of low debt acceding countries (which 
at least have some theoretical justification) while only acting against 
high debt countries if their deficits exceed 3 per cent of GDP. 
Arguably the Pact must be more discerning in this regard. This leads 
neatly to the next parameter to be discussed. 
Parameter 3: Close to Balance or in Surplus 
As noted above, new member states, have at least a theoretical case 
for maintaining higher levels of public investment expenditure. In 
this context the continuation post-enlargement of an indiscriminate 
application of the medium-term balance requirement appears 
questionable. Blanchard and Giavazzi (2003) have pointed out that 
this aspect of the Pact could be amended by a Council Resolution 
to exclude capital expenditure from the calculation of the General 
Government Balance. Milesi-Ferreti (1998) has noted the dangers in 
such an approach.   
  14 
A better approach – and one tailor-made for the present fiscal 
profile of new member states – would be to make the application of 
the medium-term balance threshold contingent upon debt levels, as 
suggested in the Sapir Report. 
Here a note of caution must be entered, however.  Evidence on 
output gaps and budget sensitivities are crucial. If relaxed too far, 
such reform would create the risk of a country’s deficit exceeding 
3.0 per cent under adverse cyclical conditions. As implied by the 
analysis further below, a permitted medium-term margin of 1 per 
cent or less (in absolute terms) seems nonetheless reasonably safe. 
Whatever risk might arise of a breach in the deficit limit could, if 
followed by quick action by the Member State concerned, be 
justified by allowing for temporary factors.12  
Putting the First Three Parameters Together; an Illustration 
Below is illustrated diagrammatically how the suggested reforms of 
the first and third parameters interact with one another, contingent 
upon the second parameter of debt thresholds. 
Taking an arbitrary debt/GDP falls below 40 per cent 
(according to Spring 2004 Commission data, this would include 
Ireland, Luxembourg, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania and Slovenia), full 
exemption from both the medium-term balance and the deficit 
criteria might be permitted. For ratios of between 40 per cent and 
50 per cent a more modest deviation from close to balance or in 
surplus could be tolerated, perhaps of up to 1 percentage point. 
This would capture Spain, Finland, the Czech Republic, Denmark, 
Poland, Slovakia and the UK. 
To return to the sustainability diagram presented earlier, the 
next figure is adjusted to allow the structural balance to be a deficit 
of 1.5 percentage points. Trend growth is assumed to be 4 per cent 
per annum (it is assumed that by the time new member states have 
joined EMU, their trend growth will have settled down) and we 
assume that “exceptional circumstances” are defined as GDP 
growth is less than 1 per cent or negative. The same budgetary 
elasticity and simple sine function as before apply. It is assumed that 
the country concerned has a debt ratio below an identified tolerance 
threshold for the medium term “close to balance or in surplus” 
criteria. 
The logic of the figure is simplistic, although not necessary less 
than the Pact itself. The result is nonetheless reassuring in terms of 
both redefining exceptional circumstances as constituting a growth 
rate of zero per cent and of permitting structural deficits of up to 
1.0 percentage points for low debt countries. The actual budgetary 
balance does not fall below 3 per cent until just after actual growth 
has turned slightly negative.  
 
12 Note that the language of the Pact in relation to excusing temporary factors 
should not be confused with the language relating to special circumstances that 
were used in November 2003: they are different concepts. It should also be borne 
in mind that the fiscal situations in France and Germany were not temporary but 
expected to persist for another two years.  
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Figure 5:   The Operation of the Stability and Growth Pact: The Case of a New 




































































Structural balance Budget balance
Actual growth Output gap
GDP growth of less than 1.0% taken as a "severe" 
 
Parameter 4: Sound Institutional Workings 
The power of the Council in ultimately applying the Pact has been 
repeatedly noted as a key weakness. Some added powers are 
proposed to be given to the Commission under the draft EU 
constitution in relation to implementing the Excessive Deficit 
Procedure. Ultimately, however, authority will rest with the Council 
if the legal provisions of the Treaty governing the EU is to be 
observed. 
The length and complexity of the excessive deficit monitoring 
procedures are features which could, however, have been addressed 
to reduce both the long lag between the incidence of a breach of 
the Pact and its punishment, as well as the opportunity for member 
states to lobby for support in order to escape sanctions. 
 
  The latest reform of the Pact has increased, rather than decreased, 
the scope for the Council to exercise expedient judgement, without 
creating any offsetting disciplines. It has done this by lengthening of 
the monitoring and disciplinary timetable in the Excessive Deficit 
5. 
Conclusion 
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Procedure and by greatly increasing the scope for country specific 
considerations to be validly assessed in implementation. 
Institutionally speaking, the Pact has turned from being a set of 
fiscal traffic lights to being a set of speed bumps; slowing rather 
than halting the pace of fiscal decline. 
Some of the Pact’s substantive provisions have been improved; 
ther
ch to reform was possible.  The events of 
No
e is more flexibility for low debt countries in relation to the 
medium-term fiscal balance and the criterion for a “severe 
downturn” has been rationalised. These changes would be welcome 
were it not for the erosion in the credibility of the Pact arising from 
the decision to increase the Council’s facility to exempt high deficits 
from punishment with reference to country specific circumstances 
and other vaguely defined criteria. It is hard to see how the Pact can 
have a simple and transparent application across the European 
Union when decisions taken under the Excessive Deficit Procedure 
can be subject to the influence of the fiscal idiosyncrasies of twenty-
five member states. 
A better approa
vember 2003 presented not only a challenge to the Pact, but also 
in the context of enlargement and population ageing a unique 
opportunity to reform it. Had that opportunity been grasped we 
might now have a strong, simplified and credible Pact with which to 
safeguard fiscal stability and promote fiscal sustainability in Europe. 
As it is, the opposite appears to be happening.  The divergence 
between the EU’s present fiscal position on the one hand, and the 
fiscal targets for stability and sustainability contained in the Pact on 
the other is growing. Capital markets and, possibly, the monetary 
policy strategy of the European Central Bank remain the last 
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ANNEX I: KEY DECISIONS 
RELEVANT TO THE 
IMPLEMENTATION OF THE PACT 
January 2002  Commission  Recommends that early warning be send to Portugal for having missed its 
budget target for 2001 by wide margin; projected deficit for 2001 was 2.2 
per cent, indicating a deteriorating fiscal situation. 
January 2002  Commission  Recommendation that early warning be send to Germany as projected 
deficit for 2001 was 2.6 per cent, indicating a deteriorating fiscal situation. 
February 2002  ECOFIN  Council decided not to endorse the Commission recommendations and to 
close the early warning procedure. 
October 2002  Commission  Recommends that excessive deficit exists in Portugal in 2001 and that in 
the absence of rectifying measures is in prospect for 2002. 
November2002  ECOFIN  Council agrees that Portugal has excessive deficit. 
November 2002  Commission  Recommends giving early warning to France in relation to a foreseen risk 
of excessive deficit in 2003. 
January 2003  Commission  Recommends that excessive deficit exists in Germany. 
January 2003  ECOFIN  Council agrees that an excessive deficit exists in Germany in 2002. 
January 2003  ECOFIN  Council agrees and gives early warning to France. 
May 2003  Commission  Commission recommends that excessive deficit exists in France and calls 
for corrective action to be implemented by October in order to prevent an 
excessive deficit beyond 2004. A similar decision is taken with respect to 
Germany. 
June 2003  ECOFIN  Council agrees and decides that excessive deficit exists in France and 
calls for France to implement corrective action. 
November  French 
government 
French Finance Minister announces intention not to take corrective action 
in respect of the planned budgetary plans which are forecast by the 
Commission to result in excessive deficits in 2004 and 2005. 
November 2003  Commission  Recommends that “notice be served” on both France and Germany for 
failing to take the corrective budgetary action in respect of the Commission 
recommendations of May 2003 as endorsed by the Council. 
November 2003  ECOFIN  Council rejects recommendation of Commission to serve notice on France 
and Germany and effectively puts the Excessive Deficit Procedure in 
abeyance. In justifying its decision, ECOFIN referred to “special economic 
circumstances” affecting the budgetary positions in France and Germany. 
January 2004  Commission  Commissioner Solbes announces a decision to request clarification from 
the European Court of Justice in respect of the legality of the ECOFIN 
decision of November 2003. 
May 2004  Commission  Commission initiates the Excessive Deficit Procedure against the 
Netherlands and adopts a report on the existence of an excessive deficit in 
Greece. 
June 2004  Commission  New Monetary Affairs Commissioner Almunia calls for a loosening of the 
Pact, by giving more weight to a country’s debt position and to “special 
economic circumstances” in assessing the acceptability of its deficit. 
July 2004  ECJ  The European Court of Justice deems that ECOFIN’s decision to put the 
Excessive Deficit Procedure in abeyance was invalid, but does so in a 
manner that does not restore the threat of sanctions against France and 
Germany. 
March 2005  ECOFIN  Recommends reforms of the Stability Pact. 
March 2005  European 
Council 
European Council endorses the ECOFIN recommendations for reform and 
calls upon the Commission to draw up proposals for their implementation.  
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